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BOOK REVIEWS

AND PAMPHLETS RECEIVED

ALL BOOKS LISTED HERE MAY BE OBTAINED, POSTAGE PREPAID, UPON APPLICATION TO THE AMERICAN PEACE SOCIETY, COLORADO BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D. C.

International Realities. By *Philip Marshall Brown*. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 226 p. and index. 1917. \$1.40.

The author has a profound contempt for "the laws of nature and of nature's God" when these are in any sense set up as the basis of international law. He endeavors to prove that nations have no legal right of sovereignty, independence, equality, and even of existence, and repudiates with considerable animus the statements maintaining these rights as they are found in the Declaration of Rights and Duties of Nations. He declares, further, that "international law is quite distinct in character from municipal law. It is truly international, and not supranational." In these statements he seems to forget or to be unaware of the fact that the provisions of the Declarations of the Rights and Duties of Nations are based solidly upon decisions of the United States Supreme Court, a court which has always been "international" in function and not in the least supranational, since it does not "appeal for recognition and enforcement to sovereign authority" in its decrees. Professor Brown's chief error here seems to be that he would pose as a modern Euclid, who would write his geometry without axioms. His statement that the "attempt to identify international law with the law of nature" is "regrettable" is somewhat nullified by the fact that no body of international law can well be built up without first having certain assumptions granted, certain axioms which must be, in effect, provisions accepted by all the nations in common as the *fundamenta* of any possible peaceful relations between the nations of the world. It is difficult to see why the authority of these provisions should be nullified merely because it is possible to class them as "laws of nature." If they have been accepted by the Supreme Court of the United States as legal axioms upon which legal decisions may be based, they may as readily be accepted by a more technically international court, or a Court of the Nations. In his statement that international law differs radically from municipal law, in that any appeal to "a common sovereign possessing coercive powers . . . becomes undesirable and repugnant, a menace to the legitimate aims and sensibilities of nations," the author is on much more solid ground. His suggestion is valuable, too, that the administrative tasks of an international executive may be adequately performed by international unions built up on the model of the Universal Postal Union. We would endorse also his assumption that educational work, societies of international law, international conferences, and similar agents for constructive peace work now in existence can be and are of great service in the formulation of an adequate body of international law. His concluding statement is undeniable: "The substitution of law for war is a stupendous task. It is therefore a most inspiring task."

The English-Speaking Peoples; Their Future Relations and Joint International Obligations. By *George Louis Beer*. Macmillan Co., New York. 322 p. 1917. \$1.50.

It is regrettable that the author in this discussion has taken pains to avoid the possibility of a democratic Germany as a full member of the Society of Nations after the war. The omission gives his book a Treitschke-like air and tends to convince the reader that he is perusing a brief for the English-speaking peoples as the saviors of the world. So close a study of the background of the war and the spirit of unity existent between the British Empire and this country deserves a greater permanence than this omission will permit it. Implicit through every chapter is the author's assumption that Germany has devised its own fate, which is no less than extinction, or, at best, a slow resuscitation under the ever-solicitous care of "the English-speaking peoples." The writer seems never to have heard, and certainly never to have understood, certain words of President Wil-

son in regard to the rights of the German people and our duty towards them. Much good material is wasted by a short-sighted application of it to the probabilities of the future.

What Did Jesus Really Teach About War? By *Edward Leigh Pell*. Fleming H. Revell Company, New York and Chicago. 180 p. 1917. \$1.00.

Again the question: "Was Jesus a Pacifist?" answered from a refreshing if not a new angle. By discarding the letter of the Word for the Spirit; looking beneath the outward aspect of Jesus' injunctions to his followers, and painstakingly trying to comprehend the real meaning of the Master's teachings, one will find, in the author's opinion, that unreasoning, non-resistant pacifism is no part of the true Christianity. In the genial mannerism of Gerald Stanley Lee, piquant and racy when it is not banal, Mr. Pell urges what he terms "Christ's idea of peace." This he also defines: "The Master did indeed come to send peace, but not the kind of peace that comes from acquiescence in the existing status when the existing status happens to be wrong." "Christian warfare" he finds to be "the earnest use of force, whether moral, intellectual, or physical, as may be necessary to break the grip of the oppressor, to hold back savagery, to lift the oppressed to their feet and give them a chance." His plea for a militant Christianity is plausible enough. It is marred principally by a view of the pacifist quite as one-sided and unreasonable as the pacifist's has ever been of the teachings of Jesus. In reviewing the position of the pacifist, Mr. Pell discards the spirit for the letter; never looks beyond the outward appearance of the pacifist's actions, and makes not the slightest effort to discern if any but a superficial significance lurk beneath his words and acts. As one reads on, one longs for a Henri Fabre of Christianity: one who not only studies his subject with solicitous care and painstaking exactitude, but who is also able to present the result of his research in a manner as solicitous and scrupulous.

In View of the End: A Retrospect and a Prospect. By *W. Sanday*, D. D., F. B. A. Oxford University Press, London. 96 p. 1916. 1s.

Dr. Sanday's view is that of an intellectual, one of the few intellectuals who has not suffered the degeneration of war-madness. Very soberly and honestly he reviews in this booklet Germany's notion of Great Britain's responsibility for the war, the British view of Germany's responsibility, the personal responsibility of the Kaiser, the body of doctrine and belief supporting the German action, the genesis of this doctrine, and the possibility of ultimate reconciliation between Germany and Great Britain. He is stalwart enough to make no excuses for either country, but to present sanely the fact that each in its own way, with much reason, considers itself self-justified. His most interesting discussion is, of course, the last, and very cleverly he bases his hopes for reconciliation upon the inherent virtues of the two adversaries. In Germany he finds the virtues of marked intellectual ability, thoroughness, solidarity and obedience to discipline, thrift, devotion to duty, self-sacrifice, and, strangest of all, veracity. Indeed, it is upon this last virtue, as upon the English virtue of fair play, that he bases his greatest hopes, for it is born of the German passion for seeing things whole and seeing them through. He believes that once this tendency turns inward, the acts of the German nation during the war must, by the very love of logic and reason inherent in the German, be viewed by the nation in the light in which they now appear before the rest of the world. "If these two countries are once more to get speech of each other, it must be their best speech. When all is said, there is no people from whom we have more to learn than we have from the Germans."